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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK H. PITTS and SANDRA J ·
PITTS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 15010

vs.
KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and
CRAIG McLACHLAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

On May 13, 1977, Appellants filed a "Motion to Correct
Record and to Strike Portions of Respondents' Brief" indicating
that they desired to file a reply brief following disposition
of the motion and before argument of the case before the Court.

No request for oral argument has been made and it is believed
that this Reply Brief is timely filed.
The denial of the Motion to Correct Record and to
Strike Portions of Respondents' Brief requires some comment
on the portions of the Brief of Respondents believed to be
improper, even though not stricken by the Court.
We still urge Rule 75(g) that the record before this
Court is the record as properly transmitted by the Clerk of
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-2the Court, and that "the matter so certified and transmitted constitutes the record on appeal."
Rule 7 5 (p) ( 2) provides for the making of a· staterrt
of facts and in the second paragraph gives the Respondent r
right to set forth portions which he controverts, providin~
that Respondent

"* * * shall make a statement of the facts
as he finds them, giving reference to the
pages of the record supporting his statement
and controverting appellant's statement."
Respondents in their Brief at page 2, lines 12-2b,
and page 4, lines 13-19, recite alleged facts which are not
part of the record on appeal and were not before the trial
court and cannot be considered by this Court, if the rules
and procedure for appeal mean anything.
Respondents were free to file affidavits in opposit
to the motion of Appellants for amendment of their summary
judgment, and failed to do so.

Had such affidavits been

filed, the attempted allegations could have been dealt wito,
If this Court were a fact-finding body, and if the allegatic
involved material facts, it would be reasonable to respond
to the matters referred to from pages 2 and 4 of Responden~
Brief.

Appellants assert that none of these matters was

before the trial court and Appellants do not stipulate that
the statements referred to at pages 2 and 4 are factual
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may properly be considered by this Court.
At page 5 of their Brief, Respondents speculate in
lines 17-24 as to what the trial court might have considered.
Appellants suggest that the trial court did not have the file
before it, might have formed a hasty opinion that the motion
of Appellants should be hastily disposed of, and thereafter
did not follow the arguments o'f counsel.

In support of this,

Appellants reason that had the trial court listened attentively
to the arguments and examined the file in detail, it could
not have made the ruling it did.
At page 5 of their Brief, Respondents speculate again
that if the relief Appellants seek were granted, there would
be done to the Respondents "a gross injustice" (line 4).

If

the Court will examine this statement carefully, it will
appear that it is predicated upon the proposition that taking
something from the Appellants is not an injustice and that
giving to the creditors of Respondents and to the Respondents
a great benefit at the expense of the Appellants is not an_
injustice, but to deprive the Respondents and their creditors
of that windfall would be "a gross injustice".

The argument

is further bottomed upon the supposition that the execution
sale would not bring a fair price for the property.

If-

Respondents were interested in protecting the property, they
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would guarantee a fair price.

There is no indication any

place in this record that Appellants are attempting to do
anything except be paid for the property which they ·sold
under contract.
ONE NEW ISSUE

Although not properly a part of the Reply Brief,
Appellants beg leave to introduce a new issue and a new
point which subsequent research has brought to their attenti
Appellants concede that Respondents should have the right to
file a responsive brief as to this point.
The original Brief of Appellants allows the positic
that the obtaining of a judgment was a performance of the
contract of sale and that title to the property passed to
someone and that the vendor's lien was thereby destroyed.
Appellants do not concede this to be the established law.
There is authority that the theory is not "perforo:
of the contract" but a question of whether the judgment
effectuates a merger of the cause of action into the judgJre:·
There is also a corolla.ry that rights existing or causes of
action existing and not necessarily involved in the grantini
of the judgment persist, and further, that to meet the
requirements of justice, the merger will have such limited
effect as is compelled.
This doctrine is summarized in 46 Am.Jur.2d,
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-5II II 390 and 393.

For instance, in Paragraph 393 appears

this statement:
."The general rule is that a lien securing a
debt which becomes merged in a judgment is
not affected by such merger.
If a debt is
of such a character that a lien is given by
common law or statute, the merger of the
judgment does not involve a merger of the
lien, and the latter may continue until the
debt is satisfied."
Am.Jur.2d cites, among other cases, Adams v. Davies,
107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207, 159 ALR 852.
The Adams case deals with a question of a merger of
one judgment into a later judgment but discusses the more
general rule of merger, and at page 210 of 156 P.2d, cites
from other cases the following:
"The doctrine [of merger] will be applied
only when the ends of justice will be thereby
subserved."
and
"It is also the law that merger is largely a
question of.intention and to a great extent
depending on the circumstances surrounding
each particular case and that the courts will
always presume against it whenever it will
operate to the disadvantage of a party."
and again

"The rule is, however, that where the··ends of.
justice require the judgment does not annihilate
the debt, and that the doctrine of merger will
be carried no further than the ends·of·justicedemand."
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-6and again
"It will not be there applied to destroy the
security of a decree as a lien to the defeat
of justice."
·
And then this Court, again on page 210 of 156 P.2d, in
conunenting on Batten v. Lauther, 74 W.Va. 167, 81 s.E. 8ll,
823, said:
"It was also said there that the first judgment
would not be extinguished unless actually satisfied.
To sununarize the rules applied to the
merger doctrine: The lesser security is absorbed
by the greater security, as the cause of action
by the judgment; the rule of merger is not
inflexible and will be applied only when Ue
ends of justice require; when such result is
not in keeping with justice, the merger doctrine
will not be allowed to impair the security of
judgments as liens. Merger is the absorption
of a thing of less importance by a greater wherebj
the lesser ceases to exist but the greater is not
increased; as to whether there is a merger ~y
depend to a great extent upon intention and the
circumstances of each particular case--the first
judgment being a right and property of the
creditor, it cannot be merge9- in a second judgment
against his will or over his objection, in the
absence of strong equitable reasons therefor;
* * *." Pages 210-211.
This limitation on the doctrine of merger applies
a further and forceful reason for permitting justice to be
done in this case by avoiding a windfall to Respondents and
doing equity to the Appellants.

Their property should not~

taken from them without the payment agreed to in the central:
The vendor's lien should not be merged into the judgment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and

-7hence into the Sheriff's deed until the debt has been paid.

Re~J.~.
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was served
on the Respondents this lOth day of June, 1977, by mailing
true and correct copies thereof, postage prepaid, to David M.
Bown and Stephen R. McCaughey, attorneys for Respondents, 321
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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